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Civil Procedure Update 2022
New Mexico State Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule Changes:
● Rule 1-003.3 NMRA, Mandatory Pre-Filing and Pre-Judgment
Certifications in Foreclosure Actions: New rule for the commencement
of foreclosure action and the certification of a pre-filing notice is
required. See Form 4-227
● Rule 1-004 NMRA, Process
o (A)(1) Provision of the rule that governs the issuance and service
of process in all civil actions except the provisions for service of
process in Rule 1-077.1 (E) shall apply in proceedings brought
under the Criminal Records Expungement Act.
● Rule 1-034 NMRA, Production of Documents:
o (2)(B): Addition of requirement that the responding party shall
state whether the response includes all responsive materials. If
the responding party withholds any responsive materials based on
an objection, the objection shall clearly describe with reasonable
particularity what materials are being withheld for each objection.
o Additional committee commentary explaining the purpose of this
amendment, the reasonable particularity standard, how to rectify
a good faith effort to resolve disputed discovery issues, and
examples of the amendment.
● Rule 1-054 NMRA,: District Court Rule for Recovery of Filing Fees
o (2)(C): Addition of electronic filing and service fees to recoverable
costs.
● Rule 1-054.2, NMRA Mandatory Pre-Filing and Pre-Judgement
Certifications in Foreclosure Actions: New rule that the plaintiff needs a
certification concerning a loan modification for as a precondition to the
entry of judgment of foreclosure by the district court. See Form 4-712
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● Rule 1-077.1, NMRA Expungement: New Rule that governs
proceedings for expungement of arrest and public records under the
Criminal Record Expungement Act, Sections 29-3A-1 to -9 NMSA 1978.
See Forms NMRA 4-951, 4-952, 4-953, 4-954, 4-955, 4-956, 4-957, 4960, 4-960.1, 4-960.2, 4-960.3, 4-958, 4-959.
● Rule 1-079 NMRA, Public inspection and sealing of court records
o (C)(11) Addition of limitation on public access for proceedings
commenced under Section 29-3A-4 of the Criminal Record
Expungement Act.
o Addition of committee commentary clarifying the release of
records sealed under the Criminal Record Expungement Act.
● Rule 1-102 NMRA, Deposit of Litigant Funds
o (A): Litigant funds deposited with the district court shall be
deposited by the court within 2 business days of receipt in a trust
checking account in a bank that is a member of the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation distinct from the court’s accounts
for general funds.
o (B) Funds deposited in a trust fund checking account under
Paragraph A shall be investing in accordance with Section 34-636 NMSA 1978 in obligations of the United States. To the extent
that the funds are deposited with the court in accordance with
Section 42A-1-19 NMSA 1978 the funds shall be invested by the
court clerk in federal securities or in federally-insured interest
bearing accounts in a financial institution located within the court’s
judicial district.
o (D) In any case in which interest is ordered to be paid under
Paragraph C, the clerk shall before making the pay ascertain the
amount if interest included and shall require the payee to furnish
a completed Form W-9 (Request for Taxpayer Identification
Number and Certification) providing the payee’s name, mailing
address, and taxpayer identification number.
● Rule 1-145 NMRA, Conservatorship Filing of Financial Statements:
New rule for conservatorship proceedings, professional conservators,
procedures and time limits for filing reports and financial statements.
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● Rule 1B-102 NMRA, Probate
o (B)(30)(c): Updated definition for proof of authority for a
domiciliary foreign personal representative to include a tribal court
appointee designated by a tribal court or the Bureau of Indian
Affairs for probate. See Forms 4B-801 and 4B-802.
● Rule 2-202 NMRA(D), Summons & Free Process Order: Addition of
language that process must be served by a person who is not a party to
the action unless the exception of service under Paragraph E. See Form
204 NMRA.
● Rule 2-701 NMRA, Magistrate Court Rule for Recovery of Filing Fees
o (2)(E): Filing fees include an electronic filing and service fee as a
recoverable cost.
● Rule 3-202 NMRA, Summons & Free Process Order: Updated language
for Summons.
● Rule 3-701 NMRA, Metropolitan Court Rule for Recovery of Filing Fees
o (2)(E): Filing fees include an electronic filing and service fee as a
recoverable cost. See Form 204 NMRA.
● Rule 23-112 NMRA, Citations for pleadings and other papers:
Committee commentary was added to clarify that self-represented
litigants must follow the same rules of procedure that apply to other
litigants.

Uniform Jury Instructions:
● Uniform Jury Instructions under Unfair Practices Act (UPA)
o UJI 13-25 Introduction NMRA: The purpose of the UJI
instructions in this chapter are for use in cases involving claims
brought under the Unfair Practices Act NMSA 1978 Sections 5712-1 to -26 (1967, as amended through 2019). The following
chapter contains instructions on the elements and damages
specific to UPA violations along with a sample set of jury
instructions and a specific verdict form in a hypothetical case
involving UPA claims in the Appendix.
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o UJI 13-2501 NMRA: Jury instruction outlining unfair or
deceptive trade practices, the elements required for claim, and
the definition of misrepresentation under the UPA.
o UJI 13-2502 NMRA: Jury instruction for the elements of
unconscionable trade practices under the UPA.
o UJI 13-2503 NMRA: Jury instruction for the definition of
knowingly under the UPA.
o UJI 13-2504 NMRA: Jury instruction outlining the connection
between the unfair or deceptive trade practices and the sale of
goods or services needed for a claim under UPA.
o UJI 13-2505 NMRA: Jury instruction for willful conduct under
UPA.
o UJI 13-2506 NMRA: Jury instruction for damages specific for a
claim under the UPA.
o UJI 13-25 Appendix NMRA: A hypothetical case involving a UPA
claim with a sample set of jury instructions and a special verdict
form to serve as a guide to structuring instructions addressing
these types of claims.
● Uniform Jury Instruction for Requests for Admissions at trial
o UJI 13-215 NMRA, Request for Admission: New Uniform Jury
Instruction that is used when a request for admission is offered at
trial.
● Uniform Jury Instruction for Insurance has no Bearing
o UJI 13-208 NMRA, Insurance has no bearing: Updated uniform
jury instruction instructing the jury that it may not consider the
presence or absence of insurance for either the plaintiff or the
defendant in determining liability or damages.
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Proposed State Rule Changes:
● Rule 11-404 NMRA, Pretrial notice; other crimes, wrongs or acts: The
Rules of Evidence Committee proposes amendments to Rule 11-404
NMRA based on a 2020 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b).
The amendments would clarify the notice requirements for the use of
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts in a criminal case. Under the
amended rule, the prosecution must provide reasonable notice in writing
before trial and “articulate in the notice the permitted purpose for which
the prosecutor intends to offer the evidence and the reasoning that
supports the purpose.” The prosecution may give notice in any form
during trial if good cause exists to excuse the lack of pretrial notice.”
● Rule 11-803 NMRA, Ancient Documents: The Rules of Evidence
Committee proposes an amendment to Rule 11-803(16) NMRA based
on a 2017 amendment to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(16). The
proposal would change the definition of an ancient document from one
"that is at least twenty (20) years old" to one "that was prepared before
January 1, 1998.”
● UJI 13-110 NMRA, Conduct of Jurors: Civil Committee proposes
amendments to the introductory instruction given in civil jury trials. The
amendments are aimed at improving the jury's comprehension of
permitted conduct during trial. In particular, the amendments would
revise the seventh paragraph to be more detailed and explicit in
instructing jurors not to use electronic resources, including internet sites
and social media, to comment on or obtain information about the
parties, witnesses, counsel, or issues in the case.
● UJI 13-2321, 13-2322, 13-2323, 13-2324, 12-2325, 12-2326,
12-2327 NMRA, Whistleblower Protection Act: Civil Committee
proposes the adoption of a set of new jury instructions, a special verdict
form, and committee commentary for use in claims under the
Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA), NMSA 1978, §§ 10-16C-1 to -4
(2010). The instructions explain the elements of a WPA claim and
provide guidance on particular elements that may be disputed in a given
case, as well as provide instruction on the statutory affirmative defense,
see § 10-16C-4.
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule Changes Projected to go into effect December 1, 2022
● Rule 7.1, Disclosure Statement
o The proposed amendment to Rule 7.1(a)(1) would require the
filing of a disclosure statement by a nongovernmental corporation
that seeks to intervene.
o The proposed amendment to Rule 7.1(a)(2) would create a new
disclosure aimed at facilitating the early determination of whether
diversity jurisdiction exists under 28 U.S.C Section 1332(a) or
whether complete diversity is defeated by the citizenship of a
nonparty individual or entity because that citizenship is attributed
to a party. Subsection (a)(2) would require that a disclosure
statement be filed “when the action is filed in or removed to a
federal court” and “when any later event occurs that could affect
the court’s jurisdiction under Section 1332(a).

Proposed Rule Changes
December 1, 2023:

Projected

to

go

into

effect

● Rule 15, Amended and Supplemental Pleadings
o Rule 15(a)(1) amends the word “within” to “no later than” to
measure the time allowed to amend once as a matter of course.
The new rule would be as follows:
1. Amending as a Matter of Course: A party may amend its
pleading once as a matter of course no later than
A. 21 days after serving it, or
B. If the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading
is required, 21 days after service of a responsive
pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under
Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.
● Rule 72, Magistrate Judges: Pretrial Order
o Rule 72(b) replaces “prompt mail” with “immediately serve”, and
connects the language to the requirements provided in Rule 5(b).
The new rule would be as follows:
b. Dispositive Motions and Prisoner Petitions
1. Findings and Recommendations. The magistrate
judge must enter a recommended disposition
including if appropriate proposed findings of fact. The
8

clerk must immediately serve a copy on each party as
provided in Rule 5(b).
● Rule 87, Civil Rules Emergency
o A new Rule 87 is proposed to address the prospect that
extraordinary circumstances may so substantially interfere with
the ability of the court and parties to act in compliance with a few
of these rules as to substantially impair the court’s ability to
effectively perform its functions under these rules. The responses
of the courts and parties to the COVID-19 pandemic provided the
immediate occasion for adopting a formal rule authorizing
departure from the ordinary constraints of a rule text that
substantially impairs a court’s ability to perform its functions.
o The new rule would be as follows:
a. Conditions for an Emergency: Judicial Conference of the
United States may declare a Civil Rules emergency for
extraordinary circumstances relating to public health or
safety, or affecting physical or electronic access to a court,
substantially impair the court’s ability to perform its
function.
b. Declaring an Emergency
1. Declaration must:
A. Designate the court or courts affected
B. Adopt all emergency rule in 87(c) unless it
excepts one or more
C. Be limited to no more than 90 days
2.
Early Termination: Judicial Conference may
terminate a declaration before the termination date
3. Additional Declarations: Judicial Conference may
issue additional declarations.
c. Emergency Rules
1. Emergency Rules 4(e), (h)(1), (i), and (j)(2), and
for serving a minor or incompetent person. By order,
the court may authorize service on a defendant
described in Rule 4(e), (h)(1), (i), or (j)(2) or on a
minor or incompetent person in the judicial district of
the US by a method that is reasonable calculated to
give notice. A method of service may be completed
under the order after the declaration ends unless the
court, after notice and an opportunity to be heard,
modifies or rescind the order.
2. Emergency Rule 6(b)(2)
A. Extension of Time to File Certain Motions: By
order, a court may apply Rule 6(b)(1)(A) to
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extend for a period no more than 30 days after
entry of the order the time to act under Rules
50(b) and (d), 52(b), 59(b), (d), and (e), and
60(b).
B. Effect on Time to Appeal: Unless the time to
appeal would otherwise be longer
i. If the court denies an extension, the
time to file an appeal runs for all parties
from the date the order denying the
motion to extend is entered
ii. If the court grants an extension, a
motion authorized by the court and filed
within the extended period is, for
purposes of Appellate Rule 4(a)(4)(A)
filed “within the time allowed by” the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and
iii. If the court grants an extension and no
motion authorized by the court is made
within the extended period, the time to
file an appeal runs for all parties from the
expiration of the extended period.
C. Declaration Ends: An act authorized by an
order under this emergency rule may be
completed under the order after the emergency
declaration ends.
● Rule of Evidence 106
o There is a proposed amendment to Rule 106, which would address
completing the “remainder of or related written or oral
statements” as opposed to its current form addressing the
completion of the “remainder of or related writings or recorded
statements.” As provided by the title change, the amendment will
now cover oral statements that have not been recorded. Most
courts have already found unrecorded completing statements to
be admissible under Rule 611(a) or the common-law rule of
completeness. The amendment expands the rule to now cover all
writings and all statements–whether in documents, in recordings,
or in oral form.
o The proposed rule also adds a requirement that the completing
statement is admissible over a hearsay objection: “The adverse
party may do so over a hearsay objection.”
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● Rule of Evidence 615
o Rule 615 has been amended to authorize the trial court to enter
an order prohibiting excluded witnesses from learning about,
obtaining, or being provided with trial testimony. The rule gives
the court discretion to determine what requirements, if any, are
appropriate in a particular case to protect against the risk that
witnesses excluded from the courtroom will obtain trial testimony.
o The rule also has been amended to clarify that the exception from
exclusion for entity representatives is limited to one designated
agent per entity. If an entity seeks to have more than one witnessagent protected from exclusion, it is free to argue under
subdivision (a)(3) that the additional agent is essential to
presenting the party’s claim or defense.
● Rule of Evidence 702
o The amendment emphasizes the admissibility requirements in
federal court must be established by a preponderance of evidence
under a Rule 104(a) hearing. The amendment clarifies the
preponderance standard applies to the three reliability-based
requirements added in 2000 in subsections (b)-(d) (i.e. the
testimony is based on sufficient facts or data, that the testimony
is the product of reliable principles and methods, and the expert’s
opinion reflects a reliable application of principles and methods to
the facts of the case).
o The rules committee advises that the amendment’s reference to
“a preponderance of the evidence” is not meant to indicate that
the information presented to the judge at a Rule 104(a) hearing
must meet the rules of admissibility. According to the rules
committee, it simply means that the judge must find, on the basis
of the information presented, that the proponent has shown the
requirements of the rule to be satisfied more likely than not. Now,
for example, if the court finds by a preponderance of the evidence
that an expert has a sufficient basis to support an opinion, the fact
that the expert has not read every single study that exists will
raise a question of weight and not admissibility. But this does not
mean, as certain courts have held, that arguments about the
sufficiency of an expert’s basis always go to weight and not
admissibility. Rather, it means that once the court has found the
admissibility requirement to be met by a preponderance of the
evidence, any attack by the opponent will go only to the weight of
the evidence.
o Rule 702(d) has also been amended to emphasize that a trial
judge must exercise gatekeeping authority with respect to the
opinion ultimately expressed by a testifying expert. A testifying
11

expert’s opinion must stay within the bounds of what can be
concluded by a reliable application of the expert’s basis and
methodology.
o According to the rules committee, this amendment is especially
pertinent in testimony of forensic experts, where, according to the
rules committee, forensic experts should avoid assertions of
absolute or one hundred percent certainty–or to a reasonable
degree of scientific certainty–if the methodology is subjective and
thus potentially subject to error. The rules committee
recommends that in deciding whether to admit forensic expert
testimony, the judge should (where possible) receive an estimate
of the known or potential rate of error of the methodology
employed, based (where appropriate) on studies that reflect how
often the method produces accurate results.

NEW MEXICO STATE APPELLATE OPINIONS
New Mexico Supreme Court Opinions
Personal Jurisdiction
Chavez v. Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC, 2022-NMSC-006, 503
P.3d 332
The New Mexico Supreme Court considered whether a foreign corporation
consents to general personal jurisdiction (i.e. a state court has all-purpose
personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant regardless of the nature or
extent of any connection between New Mexico and the claims asserted) by
registering to do business in New Mexico and appointing a registered agent
for service of process under the New Mexico Business Corporation Act. The
Supreme Court consolidated three different appeals, wherein the Court of
Appeals applied Werner v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1993-NMCA-112, 116 N.M.
229, to conclude that general personal jurisdiction was proper over Ford Motor
Company, Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, and Cooper Tire & Rubber
Company by holding each foreign corporation consented to general personal
jurisdiction by registering to do business in New Mexico.
The Supreme Court found that as a matter of statutory construction, the
Business Corporation Act does not require a foreign corporation to consent to
general personal jurisdiction in New Mexico. It noted that the Business
Corporation Act does not contain any explicit language of a foreign
12

corporation’s consent to jurisdiction unlike other similar state statutes.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held a foreign corporation has not given
consent to service and suit through mere compliance with a business
registration statute. The Supreme Court concluded that it is inappropriate to
infer a foreign corporation’s consent to general personal jurisdiction in the
absence of clear statutory language expressing this requirement.
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ holdings in Rodriguez v.
Ford Motor Co., 2019-NMCA-023, ¶¶ 31-32, 458 P.3d 569, Chavez v.
Bridgestone Americas Tire Operations, LLC, A-1-CA-36442, mem. op. ¶ 13
(Ct. App. Dec. Dec. 21, 2018) (non-precedential), and Rascon Rodriguez v.
Ford Motor Co., A-1-CA-35910, mem. Op. ¶ 13 (Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2018) (nonprecedential). The Supreme Court also overruled the thirty year old holding
from Werner by reasoning the analysis from Werner is outmoded and the
Business Corporation Act does not compel a foreign corporation to consent to
general personal jurisdiction.

Assignment of Claims
Leger v. Gerety, 2022-NMSC-007, 503 P.3d 349
This case concerned a medical malpractice lawsuit filed against Presbyterian
Healthcare Services. Presbyterian Healthcare Services sued Dr. Richard
Gerety and New Mexico Heart Institute for indemnification. Presbyterian
Healthcare Services settled the medical malpractice lawsuit and, as part of
that settlement, assigned its indemnification claim to the plaintiff.
The Supreme Court addressed whether the nonassignability provision of the
New Mexico Medical Malpractice Act in NMSA 1978, Section 41-5-12, which
states that “[a] patient’s claim for compensation under the Medical Malpractice
Act is not assignable,” prohibits the assignment of a hospital’s third-party
indemnity claim against a qualified healthcare provider. Dr. Gerety and New
Mexico Heart Institute argued the legislative intent of the Medical Malpractice
Act prohibits the assignment of all medical malpractice claims, including thirdparty indemnity claims. The plaintiff holding the assignment asked the
Supreme Court to adhere to the plain meaning of the Medical Malpractice Act
and hold that only patient’s malpractice claims are unassignable and that all
other types of malpractice claims are assignment.
The Supreme Court acknowledged the Legislature used the term “malpractice
claim” throughout the Medical Malpractice Act and could have used it in lieu
of “patient’s claim” in Section 41-5-12 had it intended the broader meaning.
“We cannot ignore this specific choice of words as an indication that the
Legislature intended only that patient’s claims, not all malpractice claims, be
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made unassignable.” Id. ¶ 32. The Supreme Court therefore concluded that
the plain language of the Medical Malpractice Act’s non-assignability provision
is clear and unambiguous and does not bar claims held by nonpatients, such
as the indemnity cause of action at issue here. Since the plaintiff stood in the
shoes of Presbyterian Healthcare Services on the assigned claims, the
Supreme Court held the indemnity claims held by the nonpatient (i.e.
Presbyterain Healthcare Services) were validly assigned and consistent with
the legislative purposes of the Medical Malpractice Act.

New Mexico Court of Appeals Opinions
Assignment & Standing on Commercial Claims
Wilson v. Berger Briggs Real Est. & Ins., 2021-NMCA-054, 497 P.3d 654
(cert. denied Oct. 2021)
Wilson was shot and paralyzed while attending a comedy show at the Navajo
Elks Lodge in Albuquerque, New Mexico. Wilson filed a complaint against
Navajo Elks Lodge for personal injuries and damages relating to the shooting.
While litigating the case, Navajo Elks Lodge’s insurer, Cincinnati Specialty
Insurance Company filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court, which
did not name or include Wilson. The federal court ruled on the declaratory
judgment action that the insurance policy procured by Berger Briggs did not
provide coverage to the Navajo Elks Lodge. In the state court action, the court
held an evidentiary hearing and entered a judgment against Navajo Elks
Lodge, awarding damages in the amount of $14.5 million to Wilson. Thereafter
and pursuant to an assignment from Navajo Elks Lodge, Wilson filed suit
against Berger Briggs, Cincinnati Specialty, and others alleging they
negligently failure to procure insurance coverage and inform, negligent
misrepresentation, along with breaches of contract, fiduciary duties, and
violations of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
Berger Briggs moved for summary judgment on all claims, contending that
Wilson’s assignment was invalid by asserting that the claims are effectively
unassignable personal injury claims. Wilson opposed the motion for summary
judgment, arguing the assigned claims were not personal injury claims, but
rather assignable commercial tort claims. The district court agreed with
Wilson’s analysis and denied the motion for summary judgment but granted
interlocutory appeal.
The Court of Appeals recognized that in New Mexico, personal injury claims
are not assignable, yet our jurisprudence suggests commercial disputes are.
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The Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion for summary
judgment by agreeing that the assigned claims are commercial in nature, and
our jurisprudence suggests and common law establishes that such commercial
claims are assignment. Berger Briggs also argued that the UPA statute is a
consumer protection law and therefore only provides standing to buyers and
sellers of goods and services. The Court held that as the assignee of the
Lodge’s claims, Wilson stood in the shoes to allege the same UPA claims that
the Lodge could have asserted against Berger Briggs.

Disqualification of Counsel
Day-Peck v. Little, 2021-NMCA-034, 493 P.3d 477
In 2008, Sandra Day-Peck entered into two settlement agreements on behalf
of her adult son and her two minor children that addressed the life insurance
policies of Day-Peck’s deceased ex-husband and the children’s father, Mark
Day. Day-Peck and the children were represented by their attorneys and
entered into the two settlement agreements. The insurance carrier of the
$500,000 policy filed an interpleader action in federal district court to
determine who was entitled to the payment of these benefits. The first
settlement agreement with the creditors pertaining to the $5 million insurance
policy was approved in July 2008. It gave Day-Peck $2.75 million and $2.75
million, plus interest, was placed in a trust for the children. The creditors
received the remainder. The second settlement agreement resolved the
interpleader action on the $500,000 life insurance policy in September 2008
and agreed that the proceeds would be divided equally between Shamaley and
the children’s trust.
In December 2014, Day-Peck filed a complaint on behalf of herself and the
children for legal malpractice, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary
duty, breach of contract, fraud, and conspiracy to commit fraud against the
attorneys who represented them in the 2008 settlement agreements. In this
malpractice action, Day-Peck claimed that the attorney’s conspired to conceal
the fact that life insurance benefits are exempted by New Mexico statute from
both the creditors of the insured and the creditors of the beneficiary. DayPeck alleged that but for the attorney’s negligence and conspiracy to keep the
New Mexico statute from them, she and the children would not have entered
into the 2008 settlement agreements and they would have received the full
$5.5 million in life insurance benefits. Day-Peck claimed her cause of action
for malpractice did not accrue until 2013 and the four year statute of
limitations should have started when an independent lawyer advised her that
he believed there had been malpractice.
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The New Mexico Court of Appeals found that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in disqualifying the plaintiff’s former counsel from representing
Day-Peck or the children in this action. Day-Peck and the children have
conflicting claims to the same $5 million in life insurance proceeds as damages
in this lawsuit and Day-Peck’s claim to the $2.75 million paid into the children’s
trust is directly adverse to the children’s interests. The district court correctly
concluded as a matter of law that the attorneys were privy to adverse
confidential information from both Day-Peck and the children and could not
avoid violating Rule 16-109(A) and (C) regarding maintaining
the
confidentiality of a former client. The Court of Appeals agreed with the district
court that the conflict tainted every aspect of the litigation and could not be
resolved by anything short of disqualification. The Court held that the district
court correctly decided that the attorney’s interests were sufficiently adversely
affected by the alleged conflict of interest to overcome the general rule that
the violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct can only be raised by a client
or former client.
The Court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when
it held her conduct was the opposite of excusable neglect because the district
court had repeated findings of unjustified neglect and did not timely respond
to motions of summary judgment before and after the disqualification of her
counsel. The Court found that according to the record, the statute of
limitations had begun immediately after the settlement agreements were
adopted when she had consulted with other attorneys and not when
independent counsel prepared filing the malpractice suit in 2013. The district
court’s grant of summary judgment and the dismissal of Day-Peck’s claim was
affirmed. The Court held that the district court’s award for the cost of
reconstructing a hard drive in defense of the lawsuit was within the district
court’s discretion to award the prevailing party’s necessary and reasonable
costs incident to their defense of an action even if the costs were not
specifically authorized by Rule 1-054(D). The Court determined that because
the costs were attributable to Day-Peck’s protection of her own interests and
not the children, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to
assess any of the costs to the children. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the district court.

Bifurcation
Sandoval v. Gurley Properties Ltd. & Board of Regents of the University of New
Mexico, 2022-NMCA-004, 503 P.3d 410 (cert. denied)
Arthur Chavez died in the care of a skilled nursing facility 19 days after he
slipped and fell on ice and snow in the parking lot of his apartment. On the
day of the fall, Mr. Chavez was taken to a hospital in Gallup where doctors
16

diagnosed him with a complex left hip socket fracture. He was then airlifted
to University of New Mexico Hospital (UNMH). He remained at UNMH for seven
days until he was discharged to Paloma Blanca Health and Rehabilitation, LLC.
He died twelve days later from a pulmonary embolism. Plaintiffs filed suit
against Gurley Properties Limited (who operated the apartment complex),
UNMH, Paloma Blanca, and individual medical providers for negligence and
wrongful death. A jury found in favor of plaintiffs on all matters and awarded
over $18 million, determining that UNMH was 25% responsible.
UNMH appealed, claiming, among other things, the district court erred in
declining to bifurcate the trial among the successive tortfeasors. UNMH argued
that because an original tortfeasor may be held jointly and severally liable for
the entire harm, it is “unnecessary” to join the successive tortfeasor(s) when
the original tortfeasor is a party.
The New Mexico Court of Appeals determined that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in declining to bifurcate the trial because the plaintiff may
litigate against the original tortfeasor and the successive tortfeasor(s) in a
single action. “To hold otherwise would undermine longstanding rules allowing
for permissive joinder and alternative claims, Rule 1-020(A) NMRA, and would
frustrate more fundamental notions of judicial economy.” Sandoval, 2022NMCA-004, ¶ 7. The Court of Appeals found no rationale for mandating
bifurcation in a successive tortfeasor trial as a matter of law and, thus, held
the district court acted within its bounds of discretion in declining the motion
to bifurcate.
Further, the Court of Appeals concluded that the jury was adequately
instructed on how to attribute damages for pain and suffering for each injury
and were correctly instructed to decide each defendant’s case separately. The
jury was told that Gurley’s liability was based on the alleged failure to keep
the premises safe and UNMH’s liability was based on having failed to recognize
and diagnose Mr. Chavez’s medical condition. The jury was asked the question
to calculate all damages separately for the two injuries. The Court of Appeals
did not find the proposed limiting instruction as necessary or appropriate in
light of the other instructions. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals affirmed the
decision of the district court.

Sovereign Immunity on Tribal Land
Sipp v. Buffalo Thunder, Inc., 2022-NMCA-015, — P.3d — (cert. granted Feb.
2022)
Plaintiff Jeremiah Sipp was an employee of Dial Electric, a vendor that sold
lighting to Buffalo Thunder Resort and Casino. Sipp delivered the lights and
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alleged that while he was moving out of the receiving area, a Buffalo Thunder
employee abruptly lowered the garage door. Sipp hit his head and claimed he
was knocked unconscious and suffered severe injuries including a cervical
spine injury that required major surgery. Sipp sued the Pueblo of Pojoaque
and several Pueblo-owned entities in New Mexico state district court.
Pueblo of Pojoaque filed a Rule 1-012(B)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. Buffalo Thunder is operated by the Pueblo of
Pojoaque pursuant to a Tribal-State Class III Gaming Compact with the State
of New Mexico, as required by the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701 to 2721. Section 8(A) of the Compact addresses
subject matter jurisdiction over claims limited to “bodily injury proximately
caused by the conduct of the Gaming Enterprise” and contains both a waiver
of sovereign immunity for such claims and an express agreement to state
court jurisdiction. The state district court dismissed the case for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, ruling that Sipp did not fall within the limited waiver of
sovereign immunity contained in the Pueblo’s Tribal-State Class III Gaming
Compact.
The Court of Appeals concluded that the waiver was geared toward casino
patrons and guests who suffer physical injuries and not business entities or
corporations who enter business transactions with the Pueblo. The Court
pointed to Guzman v. Laguna Development Corp., 2009-NMCA-116, 147 N.M.
244, and R&R Deli, Inc. v. Santa Ana Star Casino, 2006-NMCA-020, 139 N.M.
85, which held that the drafters of the Compact intended a more limited usage
that excludes business entities who enter into business transactions with the
Pueblo.
The Court of Appeals noted that the Compact does not limit the waiver to
claim for injuries occurring “in” or “at” a gaming facility, but rather, Section 8
only provides a waiver for “visitors to the gaming facility” that suffer an injury
caused by the Gaming Enterprise. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded
that Sippls sufficiently pleaded he was a visitor who suffered a bodily injury
proximately caused by the conduct of the Gaming Enterprise. The New Mexico
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case. The New Mexico Supreme
Court granted certiorari on February 8, 2022.

Dismissal for Inactivity/Failure to Prosecute
Del Curto v. Deschamps, No. A-1-CA-39314, mem. op. (Ct. App. Dec. 30,
2021) (Bogardus, J.) (non-precedential)
The parties actively litigated a commercial case for three years before the
district court dismissed the case for lack of prosecution under Rule 118

041(E)(2) NMRA. A scheduling order was entered on May 23, 2017, which set
trial to begin in September 2018. One month before trial, on the defendants’
motion and impending retirement of the trial judge, the district court entered
an order amending the scheduling order time limits. That new order extended
discovery deadlines and reset trial for March 2019. After the case was
reassigned, the plaintiffs requested a Rule 1-016 NMRA scheduling
conference. On the morning of the conference, the judge filed an order of
recusal and a new judge was assigned. Seven months later, the court
dismissed the case for lack of prosecution. The plaintiff filed a motion to
reconsider based on the previous scheduling order instead of moving to
reinstate under Rule 1-041(E)(2). The district court denied the motion to
reconsider and the plaintiff appealed.
The Court of Appeals issued a 2-1 majority opinion, with Judge Duffy
dissenting. Judge Bogardus authored the majority opinion, which determined
there was no indication of compliance with the expired scheduling order or
with the extended deadlines for discovery and where seven months of
inactivity passed without explanation or good cause. Accordingly, the majority
concluded the district court had discretion to dismiss and deny reinstatement
under Rule 1-041(E)(2) if it found that the plaintiff was not in compliance with
the scheduling order.
The dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority’s conflation of the
standards of review under Rules 1-041(E)(1) and (E)(2). Judge Murphy noted
that under Rule 1-041(E)(1), a party can move to dismiss an action with
prejudice if the claimant has failed to take any significant action within two
years, but that the action shall not be dismissed if the party opposing the
motion is in compliance with a Rule 1-016 NMRA scheduling order. In contrast,
Judge Murphy cited Rodriguez ex rel. Rodarte v. Sanchez, 2019-NMCA-065, ¶
19, 451 P.3d 105, to note that Rule 1-041(E)(2) was intended “to provide a
standardized procedure for trial courts to evaluate the intentions of the parties
and their counsel and to rid their dockets of cases that should not be carried
as active cases.” Judge Murphy noted that a trial judge does not have
discretion to dismiss a case under Rule 1-041(E)(2) if a scheduling order has
been entered.
Quiles v. Mathews, No. A-1-CA-39206, mem. op. (Ct. App. Dec. 15, 2021)
(Duffy, J.) (non-precedential)
A pro se plaintiff appealed a trial court’s dismissal with prejudice after the
plaintiff failed to appear for an online hearing. The Court of Appeals considered
whether dismissal was proper under Rule 1-041(B) NMRA, which allows for
involuntary dismissal for failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with
the applicable rules or court orders.
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The Court of Appeals recognized that dismissal under Rule 1-041(B) is a
drastic sanction and should only occur where the party’s conduct is “extreme.”
To satisfy this high burden, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the record
“must indicate willful conduct, as opposed to negligent, accidental, or
involuntary noncompliance.” Id. ¶ 4. Because the dismissal was based solely
on the failure to appear for an online hearing, the Court of Appeals concluded
the trial court improperly dismissed the case absent some finding that the
plaintiff’s conduct was willful and extreme. Notably, the Court of Appeals held
that even if the dismissal was based on the trial court’s inherent authority to
control its docket, reversal of the dismissal was still appropriate because that
standard of review is the same as a sanctions-based Rule 1-041(B) dismissal.

Timely Post-Trial Appeal
Griego v. Presbyterian Healthcare Servs., No. A-1-CA-38199, mem. op. (Ct.
App. Dec. 21, 2021) (Attrep, J.) (non-precedential)
The Court of Appeals addressed the timeliness of a post-trial appeal. The plain
language of Rule 12-201(b) NMRA requires a notice of appeal to be filed within
30-days after the judgment or order appealed from is filed in the district court
clerk’s office. The issue on timeliness arose based on a timely filed motion for
reconsideration and whether that motion tolled the 30-day deadline.
Prior to entry of a judgment, the plaintiff filed a motion for new trial on August
3, 2018, and the district court entered an order denying the motion on
November 29, 2018. On December 31, 2018, (32-days later), the plaintiff filed
a motion for reconsideration of the order denying the motion for new trial,
which was later denied on April 1, 2019. The plaintiff then filed a notice of
appeal on the motion for reconsideration on April 29, 2019.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction because the
appeal was untimely filed past the 30-day deadline. The plaintiff argued there
is potential ambiguity between Rule 1-059(E) and Rule 12-201 concerning
what is the “final order” that triggers the 30-day deadline. Plaintiff sought to
argue the denial of the motion for reconsideration was the triggering “final
order”. However, the Court of Appeals reasoned that not only was the
underlying motion for reconsideration untimely, but it amounted to an
impermissible successive attack on the final judgment that did not toll the
time to appeal.
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10th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinions
Specific Personal Jurisdiction
Hood v. American Auto Care, LLC, 21 F.4th 1216 (10th Cir. 2021)
The consumer brought a putative class action in Colorado against American
Auto Care, LLC, a Florida limited liability company who sold service contracts
that provide vehicle owners with extended warranties after the manufacturer’s
warranty expires. The class-action alleged that American Auto Care, LLC
violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act by directing unwanted
automated calls to their cell phones without consent. After purchasing a used
car, the plaintiff began receiving prerecorded calls to his cell phone claiming
that his car warranty was about to expire and offering to sell him an extended
warranty. Although he was then residing in Colorado, the calls came from
numbers with a Vermont area code. The complaint alleged that American Auto
Care, LLC used telemarketing to sell vehicle service contracts nationwide,
including in Colorado by calling Colorado phone numbers.
The District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction. Although it determined that the class had alleged sufficient facts
to establish that American Auto Care, LLC purposefully directs telemarketing
at Colorado, the District Court held that the call to the plaintiff’s Vermont
phone number did not arise out of, or relate to, American Auto Care, LLC’s
calls to Colorado phone numbers. The plaintiff appealed to the Tenth Circuit
the dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction of his putative class-action claim
against the defendant.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the District Court’s analysis, holding that the
grounds for dismissal could not stand in light of Ford Motor Co. v. Montana
Eighth Judicial District Court, 141 S.Ct. 1017 (2021). “So long as [American
Auto Care, LLC’s] marketing in Colorado was essentially the same as its
marketing in Vermont, the telemarketing calls to [the plaintiff] related” to
marketing in Colorado. The Tenth Circuit reasoned that after Ford a causal
connection between the contacts and the claims is not required to establish
specific personal jurisdiction.
Even if ACC’s call to Mr. Hood was not a direct result of its
telemarketing efforts directed at Colorado, Mr. Hood was still
injured there by activity essentially identical to activity that AAC
directs at Colorado residents. If AAC places telemarketing calls to
sell service contracts to Vermont and Colorado residents alike, it
does not matter that they called Mr. Hood from a list of apparent
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Vermont residents rather than a list of apparent Colorado
residents. We might not apply that proposition if there was a
substantial relevant difference between calls placed to residents
of the two states. But here Mr. Hood alleged that other Colorado
residents received the same type of solicitation call that he did.
The Tenth Circuit recognized that Ford makes clear that specific jurisdiction is
proper when a resident is injured by the very type of activity a nonresident
directs at residents of the forum State—even if that activity that gave rise to
the claim was not itself directed at the forum State. Accordingly, the Tenth
Circuit reversed the District Court’s dismissal.
Choice of Law
Gerson v. Logan River Academy, 20 F.4th 1263 (10th Cir. 2021)
A former student brought a diversity action in the U.S. District Court for the
Central District of California against a residential treatment facility located in
Utah, alleging that she was sexually abused by an employee at the facility.
The case was transferred to the U.S. District Court for the District of Utah. The
facility moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim, on ground that the suit
was barred by Utah’s statute of limitations. The student responded by claiming
the suit was timely under California law. The District Court granted the
facility's motion to dismiss. The student appealed.
The Tenth Circuit addressed whether Utah’s or California’s statute of
limitations applied in the diversity action. The Tenth Circuit recognized the
split in authority adopting the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which
applies the law from the state with “the most significant relationship”.
However, because the case was transferred from California, the Tenth Circuit
applied California’s choice of law rules to determine which State’s law should
apply.
The Tenth Circuit noted that California and Utah each had a “real and
legitimate interest” in having its statute of limitations applied. California,
recognizing the obstacles in bringing claims of childhood sexual abuse,
provides a generous statute of limitations. In some respects, Utah has an even
more generous statute of limitations period, but has a much shorter period for
suits against entities that are not living persons. California applies a so-called
governmental-interest analysis to resolve conflicts of laws arising from tort
claims. As such, the Tenth Circuit highlighted that California’s supreme court
has made clear that a foreign state’s interest in limiting liability for activity
within its borders predominates over California’s interest in facilitating
recovery for its residents for out-of-state injuries. As such, the Tenth Circuit
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held that Utah law governs the dispute and affirmed the district court’s
dismissal.
Article III Standing
Laufer v. Looper, 22 F.4th 871 (10th Cir. 2022)
The plaintiff, who was a self-described tester and advocate of the rights of
similarly situated diabled persons, filed suit under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) against the owners of a Colorado Inn for a violation of
regulation requiring places of lodging to identify and describe accessible
features in the hotels and guest rooms offered through its reservations service
to reasonably permit individuals with disabilities to assess independently
whether a given hotel or guest room meets their accessibility needs. The
District Court for the District of Colorado granted the owners’ motion to
dismiss for lack of Article 3 standing. The plaintiff appealed.
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff failed to show that she
suffered concrete injury in fact as required to establish Article 3 standing to
sue the inn owners for a violation of the ADA. The plaintiff’s mere status as an
ADA tester, by itself, did not automatically confer Article 3 standing to sue.
The ruling of the district court was affirmed.
Rule 56(F) Requests for Discovery and/or Leave to Amend
Adams v. C3 Pipeline Constructions Inc., 17 F.4th 40 (10th Cir. 2021)
A pipeline construction company employee filed suit against the company, C3
Pipeline Constructions, Inc., and the pipeline operators successor-in-interest,
asserting claims for sexual harassment, discrimination, and retaliation under
Title VII, New Mexico Human Rights Act, and related state tort law claims.
Upon removal, the District Court for the District of New Mexico denied the
employee’s request to defer to summary judgment in order to conduct
additional discovery, construed the employee’s opposition to summary
judgment as an implied request for leave to amend the complaint to add a
claim for premises liability, denied the claim, and granted the successor’s
motion for summary judgment. The district court adopted the report and
recommendation and entered default judgment against the company.
Employee appealed. Successor moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely.
The Tenth Circuit held that the order granting partial summary judgment to
successor was not a final, appealable order. The successor was not an
employer under the joint employer test within the meaning of Title VII. The
successor was not an employer subject to liability under the New Mexico
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Human Rights Act and New Mexico tort law. The district court did not abuse
its discretion when it denied the employee’s request to defer summary
judgment in order to conduct discovery. The employee’s allegations in the
opposition to the summary judgment state a plausible claim for premises
liability under New Mexico law. In construing the employee’s opposition to
summary judgment as an implied request to amend the complaint to add a
claim for premises liability, the district court should have considered the
allegations in the original complaint and memorandum in support of opposition
in determining whether the amendment to the complaint would be futile. The
motion to dismiss appeal was denied. The order granting summary judgment
was affirmed. The order denying the implied request to amend the complaint
was vacated.
Post-Trial Motions for New Trial or to Alter/Amend the Judgment
Hayes v. SkyWest Airlines, Inc., 12 F.4th 1186 (10th Cir. 2021)
A former employee brought claims for retaliation against the employer,
SkyWest Airlines, under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and for
discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).
The jury rendered a verdict in the employee’s favor. The District Court for the
District of Colorado denied the employer’s motion for a new trial and awarded
front pay. The employer appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying a mistrial based on an incident in which the paralegal gestured to a
corporate representative while she was on the stand. The district court did not
abuse its discretion in denying a mistrial based on an incident in which a juror
and the employer’s corporate representative spoke to each other in violation
of the court’s order. The district court did not abuse its discretion to deny the
employer’s motion for a new trial based on the claim that the employee failed
to disclose evidence. The district court did not commit a clear error when it
determined the employee was entitled to a front pay award and that the
employer’s successor would have continued the employee's term of
employment until retirement age. The employee did not cut off entitlement to
front pay when he left his first post-termination job for a lower paying job.
The ruling of the district court was affirmed.
Osterhout v. Board of County Commissioners of LeFlore County, Oklahoma,
10 F.4th 978 (10th Cir. 2021)
An arrestee filed a Section 1983 action against the board of county
commissioners and the deputy sheriff of LeFlore County alleging that the
deputy used excessive force during a traffic stop. The District Court for the
Eastern District of Oklahoma denied the board’s motion for summary
24

judgment, granted the deputy’s motion for remittitur, and denied the deputy’s
motion for a new trial. The defendants appealed.
The Tenth Circuit held that the arrestee had satisfied the Oklahoma
Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA) requirement to include his contact
information in his notice of a claim. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying the deputy’s motion for a new trial based on the
arrestee’s counsel’s improper questions. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in its determination that the arrestee’s improper statement in his
closing argument did not warrant a new trial. The district court did not abuse
its discretion by using a verdict form that only contained one line for
compensatory damages. The district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying the deputy’s motion for a new trial on the grounds that the jury's
award of $3 million in compensatory damages was grossly excessive and
unsupportive. The board’s failure to file a renewed motion for judgment as a
matter of law constituted a waiver of its challenge to the district court’s denial
of summary judgment. The ruling of the district court was affirmed.

U.S. Supreme Court Opinions
Intervention
Cameron v. EMW Women’s Surgical Center, P.S.C., 142 S.Ct. 1002 (2022)
Abortion clinic and two of its doctors brought action against the Kentucky
attorney general and the cabinet secretary of Kentucky Health and Family
Services, seeking to enjoin the enforcement of a Kentucky law regulating an
abortion procedure. After the claims against the attorney general were
dismissed, the District Court for the Western District of Kentucky issued a
permanent injunction against the law’s enforcement. The Kentucky Cabinet
Secretary appealed this bench trial. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed
the district court. After the secretary decided not to seek any further review,
the attorney general moved to withdraw as counsel and moved to intervene
as party on behalf of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The Sixth Circuit denied
the motion and dismissed the petition for rehearing en banc.
The Supreme Court held that the jurisdictional requirement did not bar the
Court of Appeals from considering a motion to intervene. The mandatory
claims-processing rule did not bar the Court of Appeals from considering a
motion to intervene. The Kentucky attorney general should be allowed to
intervene in appellate proceedings to defend constitutionality of the Kentucky
abortion law. The case was reversed and remanded.
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Injunctions and Restraining Orders
Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 141 S.Ct. 2492 (2021)
The providers of abortion services filed action for declaratory and injunctive
relief by challenging the constitutionality of the Texas abortion restriction
legislation. The legislation would soon take effect and would be enforced by
private individuals rather than government officials. The District Court for the
Western District of Texas denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Defendants appealed. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stayed the district
court proceedings. Plaintiffs then filed an application for injunctive relief or to
vacate the stay.
The Supreme Court held that the application raised serious constitutional
questions and the plaintiffs did not satisfy their burden of making a strong
showing that the application is likely to succeed on the merits. It was unclear
whether the named defendants could or would seek to enforce the state’s law
against challengers in a way that might allow the Supreme Court’s
intervention. It was also unclear if existing precedent would allow the Supreme
Court to issue an injunction against state judges asked to decide a lawsuit
under the state’s law. The application was denied.
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